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Intellectual Disability M a rt h a s t o d d a r d h o l M e s
In one moment, every drop of blood in my body was brought to a stop by the touch of a hand laid lightly and suddenly on my shoulder from behind me. I turned on the instant, with my fingers tightening round the handle of my stick.
There, in the middle of the broad bright high-road … stood the figure of a solitary Woman, dressed from head to foot in white garments, her face bent in grave inquiry on mine, her hand pointing to the dark cloud over London, as I faced her.
-Wilkie Collins, The Woman in White (1860) R eaders and critics have always been struck, by the passage in which Anne Catherick, private lunatic asylum escapee, lays her hand on the body of painter Walter Hartright. Wilkie Collins's The Woman in White-serialized in 1859-60-here establishes its future identity as a sensation novel. The scene has been amply addressed by literary scholarship for several decades as an exemplar of the novel's pervasive fabric of mental disturbance. 1 The character who gives The Woman in White its name, however, has slipped out of the critical conversation as silently as she slips out of the plot of the novel, as has the fact that the landscape of mental differences includes, through Anne, not just nervousness, paranoia, monomania, and hypochondria, but also intellectual disability.
Contextualizing Anne-and a host of other intellectually disabled characters in the works of Collins, Charles Dickens, and Elizabeth Gaskell, to name the most prominent examples-has been difficult until quite recently. The question of how people with intellectual disabilities were "othered"-scientifically, linguistically, environmentally/spatially, socially, educationally, and sexually-through texts-including the scientific, the clinical, the educational, and the literary-has been underexamined and underhistoricized.
We might assume that in the nineteenth century, people with intellectual disabilities were even more drastically marginalized than they are now: treated as less than human, bypassed in the imagination of community or of citizenship, seen as metaphors for lack and loss or as figures for entire groups, or considered tragically inferior or curiously/terrifyingly alien. There is much truth in such assumptions, but the uneven discursive landscape in which such othering took place is as complex as the fictional representations of mental disability that Collins, Dickens, and others contributed to the ongoing construction of intellectual disability.
First, intellectual disability is both embedded in language and, concurrently, a form of linguistic othering that relies upon language as the agent of its social enactment. The Victorian period represents a fascinating segment in the dynamic linguistic timeline of the naming of intellectual difference, in which the term idiot was disaggregated into various taxonomies and, eventually, hierarchies that included incurable versus educable idiocy, imbecility, and mental deficiency. The complexity and variability of these discursive threads, and the purposefulness of their existence, is a rich focus far beyond the scope of this essay, but a few basics allow us to consider Anne with greater nuance. In (roughly) the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, a notable slipperiness of terminology meant that any number of words or phrases, all of them painful to read or use but necessary in this essay, might be applied to people we would now consider intellectually disabled: idiot, imbecile, mental defective, simpleton, mindless person, natural. A key distinction, however, operates between the lunatic and the idiot. As David Wright notes in his foundational work on the history of mental disability, the category of insanity included both the mad and the intellectually disabled:
The nineteenth-century term of "idiot" referred to persons who were considered as suffering from mental disability from birth or an early age….
[I]diocy reflected a permanence of mental disability…. "Lunatics," by contrast, referred to all those who, though previously "sane," suffered from a temporary or permanent impairment of mental ability. By its very definition "lunacy" was not considered congenital, and in many cases held the promise of either cure or remission. (10) Over the course of the century, understandings of the malleability of intellectual disability changed. The Victorian era is known for its fervour for institutions, including those that removed disabled people from community life. The purposes of at least some institutions for mental disability, however, included educating "idiot children" to become functional members of society.
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At least for a substantial part of the century, intellectual disability was thus a dynamic category that invited consideration of the ways in which intellectual difference stemmed from human similarity and in which the difference was considered not simply in terms of kind (intellectually disabled people as radically other) but in terms of degree (intellectual ability as a continuum).
The ambiguity with which The Woman in White represents Anne's intellectual state operates within this dynamic space, not only referencing contemporary ideas about the possibility for moral management of intellectually disabled people but also suggesting, as Collins loves to do, the possibility of not just community but intimacy between "normates" and their others.
Anne is described as having an intellect "not as developed as it ought to be," an "unusual slowness in acquiring ideas," and "defects of intellect" (98-99). She is characterized as "queer," "weak in the head," "half-witted," "crazy," an "idiot,"-subject to "delusions," "vacant," "restless," "confused," and "afflicted" (130, 604) . The ambiguous and inconsistent discourse suggests intellectual disability as often, or more, than it does madness. What makes this construction of Anne Catherick's condition even more fascinating is the definiteness with which the novel links Walter's desire for his future wife-Laura Fairlie, who will be revealed as Anne's half-sister-to his earlier desire for Anne.
Walter's first impressions of Anne-a woman alone in the early hours of the morning, touching him-are clearly sexualized before they are pathologized, as he invites us to "remember that [he] was young; remember that the hand which touched [him] was a woman's" (66). On finding she has escaped from an asylum, his interpretive framework shifts from the sexual to the psychiatric-but the impression remains. And when, not long after his arrival in his new position at Limmeridge House, Walter undergoes an uncanny sensory repetition of his experience of meeting Anne in a moonlight glimpse of his pupil, heiress Laura Fairlie, he uses the language of deficiency but experiences no lack of desire-an impression of "something wanting." When he realizes that Laura reminds him of Anne, tellingly, the distinction he creates between the two women is one of degree rather than one of kind: "If ever sorrow and suffering set their profaning marks on the youth and beauty of Miss Fairlie's face, then, and then only, Anne Catherick and she would be the twin-sisters of chance resemblance, the living reflections of one another" (132). While he seems at times to be the only one joining the links on the associative chain, Walter's narration continually links Anne to erotic feelings, while also accepting the idea that she is intellectually disabled.
Desire in The Woman in White is thus linked to intellectual disability. Through Walter's responses to Anne, Collins seems to posit the attractiveness and sublimity of entering a literal contact zone with mental difference.
The paucity of analysis of Anne and complete absence of published analysis of Collins's intertwining of intellectual disability and eros return us to the puzzle of why "mindlessness" has been so much less compelling than "madness." One reason for the underdevelopment of literary and historical scholarship on intellectual disability in Victorian culture may be that people who do not consider themselves disabled are habituated to apprehending disability as unquestionably other and intellectual disability as a particular depth of alterity, and nothing propels the questioning of constructions so firmly embedded that they are taken for truths. As Patrick McDonagh suggests, Perhaps our unwillingness to look directly at what a relatively slow cognitive process means to us has made idiocy (or intellectual disability-or, for that matter, intelligence) seem invisible as a category worthy of critical analysis; we have long assumed it to be an ideologically neutral designation, although nothing could be further from the truth. (9) What is necessary, then, is a real shift in thinking about intellectual disability as not inherently marginal but instead purposefully marginalized. The Victorian people who lived inside, outside, and in transit between the categories of "normalcy" and "idiocy" were real people, but the categories themselves were socially constructed, a way of speaking about and purposefully "realizing" forms of human variety. We might also posit intellectual disability as not marginal but rather central to the most important questions we-and the Victorians before us-ask about what it means to be human. The category, if we unmask it, reveals the degree to which intellectual performance functions as a passport to the realm of the human or relegates individuals to a liminal place between the human and animal. What we learn in examining intellectual disability and how it has been shored up (and reinforced, as Simpson argues) as a category distinct from "normal" intellectual functioning may also suggest the way that many people manage their emotional response to the disability that is ultimately part of life, if we live long enough. Intellectual disability is a near-universal experience, one that we may visit only briefly but eventually will probably inhabit. Particularly now, as dementia, sometimes early-onset, becomes a reality for the babyboom generation, these are crucial investigations for all of us to undertake, and the nineteenth century can tell us something about them.
A key locus in such discussions, and a key source of discomfort, of course, is the question of sexuality that The Woman in White so effectively posits, reminding us how imperfectly articulated are our ideas not simply about who can or should be sexual but about what "being sexual" means and sexuality's culturally inscribed, but insufficiently explicated, links to concepts of intellectual agency, as well as to childhood, adulthood, and personhood itself. Desiring someone who is not simply mentally disturbed or "mad" but cognitively, intellectually, or developmentally disabled poses significant questions, turning a gaze, above all, on the character of the person desiring the intellectually disabled object. We are more comfortable with the notion that Victorian men might prefer childish women-or that they might prefer other men-than that they might prefer children, and the association of intellectual disability with childhood raises this spectre.
If the assumption-and it bears more interrogation-is that sex takes place between equal partners, desire for-and with-an intellectually disabled person challenges and critiques that already fraught and unconsidered rule. The Woman in White is thus an excellent locus in the history of discussions about who should or should not be sexual and what "having sex" is, as well as, of course, who should or should not inhabit the world and reproduce themselves. The novel, in troubling the boundaries between who can be a sexual subject and who cannot-or even what "sexuality" is and is not-on the basis of a concept of intelligence, reveals them and offers them for critical questioning. in England. John Langdon Down, its superintendent from 1855-1868, originated one of the century's most infamous "discoveries" about intellectual disability through his atavism-based concept of mental disability as a reversion of a Caucasian child to racialized characteristics seen as developmentally earlier and more primitive. Down's theory stems from a belief in the unity and common origin of races and thus can be viewed as relatively liberal, despite the fact that this figuration of mental disability tied to a racialized phenotype would persist, reshaped in the eugenicist climate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries into an effect that could be traced to, and would substantiate, the cause of degeneration. As Wright notes, "Although, to our ears, Down's suggestion that Caucasians were more developed (in evolutionary terms) than Mongols might well come across as 'racist,' his views, in some key intellectual aspects, actually placed him in a liberal school of thought-that is, with those who believed that all races shared a common ancestry. The alternative view … contended that other races were derived from separate origins (and, by implication, that Caucasians were of an independent and superior racial type)" (52). And what if disabled people were understood to be both subjects and objects of a multiplicity of erotic desires and practices? Moreover, what if examining the ways in which these desires are enabled, articulated, and represented in various contexts-contemporary and historical, local and global, public and private-made possible the reconceptualization of the categories of both "sex" and "disability"? (1-2). We need-with the help of texts such as The Woman in White-to reread our sense of the parameters of such reconceptualizations and to investigate the wide range of anxieties, and understandings, that they suggest.
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• "A Human Bundle": The Disaggregated Other at the Fin de Siècle r ya n s w e e t Picture your valet taking off both your legs … , carefully placing away your arm, disengaging your wig, easing you of your glass eye, washing and putting by your masticators, and, finally, helping the bare vital principle into bed, there to lie up in ordinary, like a dismantled hulk [.] … In these latter days we are, indeed, sometimes, as the Psalmist said, fearfully and wonderfully made; and, like the author of Frankenstein, we may tremble at our creations. (A. W. 220) I n the 1859 Once a Week article "The Artificial Man," the author expresses concern at the dehumanizing implications of an increased reliance on human prostheses. Mirroring Edgar Allan Poe's "The Man That Was Used Up" (1839), a short story about a war veteran whose reliance on prosthetics is revealed in an almost identical undressing scene, this article reveals anxiety about both the potential for technology to supplant the organic whole and the ability of medicine to preserve life at the cost of human agency. The horror evoked here, as signalled by the allusion to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818) and the accompanying illustration ( fig. 1) , which shows an elderly man with four false limbs and a wig chasing a petrified able-bodied gentleman, reveals a fear about scientific progress gone too far. Though more concerned with the implications of physical loss than the replacement of human parts with prosthetics, Ernest George Henham's fin-de-siècle short story "A Human Bundle" (1897) provides a grim depiction of human otherness enabled by improvements in surgical practice.
